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Crimes of a “benevolent” hegemony: Configurations 
of UK power in Northern Ireland and Iraq
Lily Hamourtziadou1 and Aidan O’Sullivan2
Abstract
Themes of hegemony and neoliberalism are explored in this paper that looks at UK role 
in crimes against humanity in Ireland and in Iraq, either alone or as part of a hegemonic 
coalition that claims to be fighting a brutal, unjust, and uncivilized insurgency. The common 
thread that ties crimes spanning 100 years is the narrative of the “benevolent” hegemon that 
kills, tortures, enslaves, and occupies for the good of the victims. Power is exercised by the 
hegemon through military and political domination under the guise of a civilized protector, 
liberator, and the bearer of progress and order.
Introduction
The Second World War officially ended in September 1945. Morally, it concluded with 
the end of the Nuremberg Trials, when justice was seemingly served for the crimes com-
mitted during the war. The trials were a series of military tribunals held by the Allied 
forces under international law and the laws of war. Prominent members of the political, 
military, judicial, and economic leadership of Nazi Germany were prosecuted and con-
victed. Many of them were sentenced to death. The first and best known of the trials, 
held November 1945–October 1946, was that of the major war criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal. While German leaders were tried for crimes committed 
during the war, no British or US leaders were ever accused of any crimes. The leadership 
behind the US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which caused the deaths of 200,000 
people, or the one behind the US-UK bombing of Dresden, which caused the deaths of 
an estimated 25,000 civilians, never faced charges. Instead, they stood in judgment of 
those they called “evil.”
It was a manifestation of a continuing narrative of power, dominance, and crimes 
that go unpunished. An unchanging narrative of “good” and “evil” that began in Ireland 100 
years ago and has been carried through to the 21st century, when the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force.
Article 7 is “Crimes Against Humanity” and it states:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against




d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of funda-
mental rules of international law;
f. Torture;
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced steriliza-
tion, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
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h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law,
in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
i. Enforced disappearance of persons;
j. The crime of apartheid;
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. (Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 2002)
A look at ICC cases reveals a picture of entirely dark-skinned leaders, primarily African:
Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Sudan.
Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, Mali.
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Sudan.
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Mali.
Abdullah Al-Senussi, Libya.
Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, Libya.
Mohamed Hussein Ali, Kenya.
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Sudan.
Narcisse Arido, Democratic Republic of Congo.
Laurent Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire.
This list is long and missing from it are UK and US leaders, tried either for recent crimes 
committed in the Middle East, or retroactively. In this paper we examine, first, Irish 
nationalism and the War of Independence, and British responses to the Irish insurgency. 
In the second part, the focus shifts to the Middle East and crimes committed by the 
US-UK coalition against Iraqi civilians, all of which (as in the Irish case) have gone 
unpunished.
Crimes against the Irish: the road to Ballymurphy and Bloody Sunday
In 2021, Northern Ireland marked its centenary of existence. Its foundation was concurrent 
with the conclusion of the Irish War of Independence. Treaty negotiators from the revolu-
tionary Irish Parliament, the Dáil Éireann, agreed with the British Government to found an 
Irish Free State with 26 counties in the Northwest, East, West, and South of the Island. 
Meanwhile in the historical province of Ulster, which ostensibly consists of nine counties, six 
counties would remain within the United Kingdom and form the basis for Northern Ireland. 
There was to be a Protestant majority population within this new polity, hence the exclusion 
of three other counties with nationalist majorities who tended to be Catholic: Donegal, 
Monaghan, and Cavan (Allen, 2021). From this point, two main political ideologies were pre-
sent in Northern Ireland. “Unionist” ideology represented those who believed in the mainte-
nance of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. This identity is often coterminous 
with “Loyalism,” broadly referring to a strong “Ulster” identity. It is primarily Protestant in 
character and requires defense from “nationalists” or “Republicans” in Northern Ireland who 
seek to reunite the six counties with the 26 counties in a 32-county Republic. It also views 
reunification as not only a loss of British identity, but a possible subservience of Protestants 
to Catholic dominance as well. Unionists and/or Loyalists are largely Protestants while 
Nationalists/Republicans are largely Catholic.
Over the following decades, through gerrymandering in constituencies with nation-
alist majorities, unionist governments dominated. Other legislative maneuvers involved 
restricting voting to property owners in a polity where the vast majority of Catholics are 
renters. The Special Powers Act gave the Executive the authority to ban demonstrations 
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and speeches and provided for summary bans and measures from the Home Affairs minis-
ter as they saw fit (Finn, 2019). From 1920 to 1969 The Unionist Party held unbroken rule 
with four prime ministers in that time (Finn, 2019). Other markers of experience for 
Catholics in Northern Ireland included suspensions of nationalist councils, oaths of alle-
giance for teachers and State employees, and discrimination in housing and jobs (Allen, 
2021). Protestant Unionist politicians maintained a dominance over the Catholic Irish pop-
ulation through the new Parliament at Stormont Assembly. This meant that Northern 
Ireland was an inherently sectarian creation that Labour and Conservative Governments in 
London tolerated and defended for the majority of the 20th century and resisted calls for 
local government reform.
This is a first corrective to revisionist Irish historiography that sometimes paints the 
War in Northern Ireland as largely the result of religious differences between two immuta-
bly sectarian sections of the Irish population. The structures of the new State were sectarian 
in conception. Not only that, but Northern Ireland was originally conceived in 1919 as a 
temporary solution to undermine any newly independent state that Walter Long proposed 
as part of the Long Committee while drawing up the Government of Ireland Bill. This shows 
that Northern Ireland’s original raison d’être was not just finding a “Protestant Parliament 
for a Protestant People” (albeit ignoring the numerous Catholics that lived within its bor-
ders), but also to undermine the newly independent 26-county state. Walter Long was also 
one of the first proponents of using ex-servicemen to align with the RUC and form the hated 
counterinsurgency force the Black and Tans during the War of Independence (Allen, 2021). 
The Black and Tans became synonymous with numerous abuses and killings of the Irish 
population in their attempt to quell support for Irish Republican Army (IRA) units in the 
Irish countryside. This resulted in increased resentment towards the British Empire and its 
presence in Ireland, especially when in 1921 British troops opened fire on Gaelic Football 
spectators in Dublin (Finn, 2019).
During the War of Independence the Ulster counties that were to make the future 
constitutional basis of Northern Ireland were a site of sectarian violence against Catholic 
families from which the IRA units who were active in the other provinces were largely absent. 
One of the groups orchestrating the sectarian violence was one of the first loyalist militias in 
the 1920s, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), after Nationalist and Labour parties won elec-
tions in 1920 (Allen, 2021). Several expulsions of the Catholic population followed, including 
10,000 Catholics from Belfast. These pogroms also targeted “rotten Prods,” or Protestants 
deemed disloyal to the Empire (Allen, 2021). The burning of 300 homes in Lisburn followed 
the IRA shooting of a police officer who allegedly assassinated the Lord Mayor of Cork 
Thomas McCurtain. This continued throughout 1920 and 1922 with the deaths of 44 Catholics 
and 22 Protestants in May 1922 alone. This period would see the formation of a volunteer 
force, the Ulster Special Constabulary, that would form the basis of the B Specials up until 
the 1970s. The UVF, which was leading a lot of the violence at the time, had units incorpo-
rated into this new policing body (Allen, 2021). This was an early sign of the shared member-
ship between loyalist paramilitary forces and security forces such as the police and local 
army regiments that would become a feature of collusion throughout the Troubles.
Keeping Northern Ireland and quelling dissent was important for a possible roll-
back of the newly independent Irish State. Throughout the 20th century as the British 
Empire collapsed and more colonies gained freedom, emphasis shifted to maintaining 
Northern Ireland’s place in the Union. This is important to remember as a corrective to 
ideas that Britain was largely a reluctant participant into a civil war between two communi-
ties with ancient hatreds. Arguably the current UK Government cares little for Northern 
Ireland’s place in the Union, considering the Conservative Party overwhelmingly voted for 
the Northern Ireland Protocol that effectively places the six counties under a different cus-
toms regime than the rest of the UK. This protocol faces increasing activism and vitriol from 
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large unionist parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and representatives of 
dormant Loyalism paramilitary groups such as the UVF, the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA), and the Red Hand Commando within the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC) 
(Rutherford, 2015).
With the Black and Tans and the War of Independence, insurgency and counterin-
surgency were already a feature of the British Army on the island of Ireland in the 20th cen-
tury. The IRA guerrilla campaign in the countryside became influential for armed liberation 
movements and anti-imperialist struggles, with personal accounts from leaders such as Tom 
Barry and Dan Breen gaining readers as far afield as India and Cuba (O’Sullivan, 2021). 
McGovern (2019) states that British counterinsurgency thought and practice is rooted in the 
conduct and maintenance of imperialism and “small wars” and centers on “necessity” and 
not “minimum force.” This can help describe the eventual character of collusion, particu-
larly its emphasis on eliminating enemies and instilling fear in a population. He states that 
current British doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq focuses on weakening the link between the 
population and insurgents. McGovern cites the work of Charles E. Caldwell, Charles Gwynn, 
and of direct relevance to Northern Ireland, Frank Kitson, as central to the formation of 
British counterinsurgency doctrine. Callwell’s key work is Small Wars and stated that “moral 
force” had to be impressed on the subject populations of colonies. A lot of the discourse 
betrays deeply racist ideas on the need to demonstrate their “moral inferiority,” which 
McGovern states is an analogue to “shock and awe” tactics (McGovern, 2019: 13). This 
included the destruction of civilian food sources and villages and towns to choke off support 
for rebels but to convince the population not to rise up.
Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing released in 1934 was also a standard text. Gwynn, 
like Callwell, paid little attention to the experience in Ireland. The post-independence real-
ity led him to counsel against taking lessons from the experience there despite the outrages 
committed on the population by Auxiliaries and Black and Tan soldiers. From 1920, British 
policing in Palestine followed the template of the Black and Tans in Ireland and the Royal 
Irish Constabulary. This was also the same time that allegations arose of forced labor, razing 
of houses, and soldiers fastening Arab citizens to military vehicles in transit. The lack of 
reference to Ireland is surprising as both authors had family there. Gwynn stated that the 
military should be an “aid to civil power” and to rely on minimum and necessary force as the 
situation demands (McGovern, 2019: 14). In addition, the collaboration between British 
troops and Jewish settler militias was prominent. This of course is important to consider 
considering Frank Kitson’s advocacy of “counter-gangs” in Kenya and Northern Ireland. 
However, while Gwynn may emphasize legality, this could also include martial law and in 
Palestine there were summary judgements of Arab civilians and no prosecution of soldiers.
The final theorist is General Frank Kitson with overall responsibility for troops in 
Northern Ireland in 1970–2. Before that, he had served in Kenya, Oman, Malaya, and Cyprus. 
In Kenya, Kitson advocated for the use of “counter-gangs.” Kitson was concerned for coun-
terinsurgency to appear in line with the rule of law and McGovern attributed this to the 
post-1945 order. Kitson served in Malaya during the “Emergency” 1948–50 under the com-
mend of Robert Thompson who made the appearance of legality central to his role in coun-
terinsurgency despite the fact widespread illegality and human rights abuses were central to 
that operation. For Kitson there were two main factors for measuring a counterinsurgency’s 
success, the law and “expediency” (McGovern, 2019: 17). Kitson stated that the law was often 
unworkable and that “law should be used as just another weapon, and in this case it becomes 
little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public” 
(McGovern, 2019: 18). With this in mind, the civil authorities were to ensure a legal system 
that gave cover to state agents and avoid their prosecution. The use of locals to engage in 
fighting has been an aspect of British counterinsurgency for a century and this is still occur-
ring in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gordon Kerr, who was head of the Force Research Unit, would 
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later serve in Iraq according to news reports (McGovern, 2019), though some reports contra-
dicted this (MacKay, 2019).
The use of counterinsurgency tactics on the island of Ireland would resume follow-
ing a complete breakdown of order between Catholic protesters and a Protestant ruling 
class. Throughout the course of the 20th century, there were minor incursions from 
Republican paramilitary groups across the new border between the 26 counties (declared a 
Republic in 1948) and Northern Ireland, with a variable relation to the original IRA of the 
Irish War of Independence. Ties included the involvement of veterans who did not accept 
the partition after the end of the original War of Independence and younger volunteers. One 
serious attempt was the disastrous Border Campaign in the 1950s. There were numerous 
arrests of volunteers on both sides of the border and they held few weapons or personnel.
The Catholic population were still experiencing extreme inequality in Northern 
Ireland. Members took inspiration from the activism of the civil rights movement in America 
and decided to follow the example of Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks, forming the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1967. Meanwhile two new groups were 
forming from the IRA, the Official IRA (OIRA) and the splinter group, the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA), but both wings were extremely marginal after the Border Campaign (Finn, 2019). 
The NICRA committee focused on civil rights for Catholics and avoided questions of the 
Union. “British Rights for British Citizens” was a regular slogan of these marches (McKearney, 
2016: 114). This also underlines an important and overlooked reminder that the Bloody 
Sunday Ballymurphy massacres were essentially attacks on British civilians. The Provisional 
IRA did not make the break with Britain its primary platform until after internment and 
Bloody Sunday in 1971–2 (McKearney, 2016). Much like the civil rights marches in the USA, 
NICRA met serious police oppression from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), denounce-
ment from the Unionist establishment, and smears of being an IRA and Roman Catholic 
front for the takeover of Ulster. At the same time, a British Army veteran Gusty Spence 
formed the UVF, taking its name from the paramilitary group of the 1910s.
Smears of the protesters being a front for the IRA would continue long after the 
British Army killed 14 of them on Bloody Sunday. In 1968, NICRA announced an intention 
to march in Derry, as did local activist group the Derry Housing Action Committee. After 
fractious scenes on 5 October 1968 where protesters experienced beatings the then First 
Minister Terence O’Neill sacked his home affairs committee and called for a truce that the 
marchers agreed to, suspending marches for a month. A group of student activists known as 
People’s Democracy broke this truce a year later. O’Neill left office a year later after a series 
of bombings at power and water installations that the police attributed to the IRA but were 
in fact the responsibility of the banned UVF (Finn, 2019). Big victories included the election 
of prominent members in the civil rights groups, such as Bernadette Devlin and John Hume, 
as MPs. At the same time, the Unionist marching season began and civil rights activists were 
determined for the marches and the police not to enter the Catholic area of Bogside in 
Derry. The Apprentice Boys, a loyalist heritage group began marching to counter demon-
strations. Rioting had erupted again and by the time the British PM sent in British troops ten 
had died and 2,000 families, 80% of them Catholic, were evicted from their home (Finn, 
2019). Republicans were active as well, with incendiary devices planted at post offices and 
organizing the Derry Citizen’s Defence Association (Finn, 2019).
British PM Harold Wilson deployed troops, but Stormont still held control, with Ian 
Freeland as General Officer Commanding. Anecdotes abound of how relations were initially 
good between the Army and Catholic population but this fell apart with the colonial style 
policing that put restrictions on whole communities. After an April 1970 riot in Ballymurphy 
in response to an Orange Order march, Prime Minister Chichester-Clarke blamed the loss 
of two by-elections on this disorder and expressed his demand to Ian Freeland that it not 
happen again. The RUC asked Chichester-Clarke to ban Orange Order marches in the 
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summer of 1970 but he refused, afraid of what his party would do. Freeland aimed to push 
the Orange Order through the nationalist area of Ardoyne (Finn, 2019). The weekend, which 
also saw sectarian rioting and the first actions by the newly formed Provisional IRA, left six 
dead, with the latter killing three. Afterwards a Joint Security Committee made up of the 
RUC, the Army, and Stormont decreed that any further confrontations would meet a show 
of force. This came after a stone-throwing crowd responded to an arms search in the Lower 
Falls Road area in Belfast. This area was a stronghold of the Official IRA. A confrontation 
with OIRA volunteers followed and the Army used 1,500 rounds of live ammunition and CS 
teargas, resulting in the death of four civilians. The sentiment of the population sentiment 
turned against the Army (Finn, 2019).
The Official and Provisional factions were also engaged in rivalry over who was the 
source of defense for the besieged Catholic civilians of Northern Ireland. A very telling anec-
dote about the damage that the British Army were inflicting on their own reputation comes 
from Finn (2019). Rioting broke out again in Ballymurphy and the Army responded with 
rubber bullets and CS gas. Billy McKee sent Brendan Hughes to attack British soldiers but 
local commander Gerry Adams told him that his volunteers would not attack the soldiers, in 
line with the Napoleonic adage never to interfere with an enemy while they were making a 
mistake. Stormont passed a Criminal Justice Act that widely punished the community and 
not just the young and unemployed rioters. In early 1971 after more clashes in Belfast, a PIRA 
sniper killed the first British soldier of the Troubles. There was still a civil rights movement 
alongside an increasingly strident armed force campaign from two competing groups. The 
Catholic population in the ghettos of Derry and Belfast was getting more and more radical-
ized. Internment without trial followed a PIRA bombing campaign that injured scores of 
civilians (Finn, 2019). A subsequent bombing of McGurk’s bar in North Belfast followed. The 
UVF claimed it, despite the authorities stating that it was an IRA bomb that exploded pre-
maturely. They offered this as a justification for internment, which no loyalists were snapped 
up in (McGovern, 2019). This claim, despite evidence to the contrary, was part of Army pub-
lic relations and disinformation linked to Kitson’s unit, the Military Reaction Force (MRF), 
later the Special Reconnaissance Unit (SRU), both which became implicated in allegations 
of direct involvement in the McGurk’s bar bombing. A decade later, they would be the tem-
plate for the Force Research Unit (McGovern, 2019).
The PIRA were at this point trying to goad more shows of strength and direct rule 
from London from Harold Wilson’s successor, Edward Health. Internment would become 
the new locus of civil rights organizing. Operation Demetrius began with over 300 arrests in 
August 1971 and internment at Long Kesh gave rise to stories of beatings, sleep deprivation, 
and false executions by dropping blindfolded prisoners a few feet off the helicopter while 
under the impression that the drop was several hundred feet higher. This was reminiscent 
of the actual execution method used by several South American governments and these 
tactics often had been used in British colonies (Finn, 2019).
What also arose from this time are termed the “five techniques”: “wall postures, 
hooding, noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and water” (International 
Criminal Court, 2020). The European Court of Human Rights would rule these techniques 
as a contravention on the European Convention on Human Rights and its ban on degrading 
and inhuman treatment (ICC, 2020). A ban on the five techniques followed their use in 
Northern Ireland yet there was a lack of clarity whether this ban applied for wartime deploy-
ments as well as for internal security operations. This was the statement from the Baha 
Mousa Inquiry (ICC, 2020). The judgement from Justice Leggatt as recently as 2017 in Alseran 
& Others v Ministry of Defence states:
As the lessons of Northern Ireland, The Baha Mousa Inquiry and the al-Bazzouni case 
do not seem to be fully absorbed by the MOD, I consider that the court should now 
make it clear in unequivocal terms that putting sandbags (or other hoods) over the 
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heads of prisoners at any time and for whatever purpose is a form of degrading 
treatment which insults human dignity and violates Article 3 of the European 
Convention. ([Quoted in ICC, 2020: 29).
This highlights what McGovern (2019) states about the supposed lack of legal framework 
guiding the use of state agents in his study of collusion in Northern Ireland. A critical view 
may suspect that such vagaries and absences of legal framework allow flexibility within the 
law and may allow iterations of these techniques to travel from Northern Ireland to future 
deployments in Iraq just as they arrived in Northern Ireland after purported use in colonial 
ventures in Aden and Kenya (Cobain, 2012).
Operation Demetrius predictably triggered further violence, with 17 dead within 
over 9–11 August, including ten civilians killed in Ballymurphy by British forces. The 1st 
Battalion Parachute Regiment, known colloquially as “Kitson’s private army” (McGovern, 
2019: 161), of the British Army carried out these killings and they would do so again on 
Bloody Sunday the following year in Bogside in Derry. Recruitment soared to OIRA and 
PIRA. The UDA formed at this point and took its place alongside the UVF as a prominent 
loyalist paramilitary force. This was not just mere tolerance, but the loyalist paramilitaries 
would be in the service of military intelligence due to the similar aim to maintain the secu-
rity of the state. The then First Minister Brian Faulkner was home affairs minister during 
Operation Harvest, the IRA’s 1950 Border Campaign, when internment had worked, so he 
surmised that it should work again. However, the lack of sympathy by the nationalist popu-
lation in the North during the Border Campaign ensured its defeat while the later intern-
ment turned the population’s sentiments against the security forces, resulting in a lack of 
informers from the Catholic ghettos (Finn, 2019). Nationalist tenants organized a rent and 
rates strike, erected barricades, and instituted no-go areas in Belfast and Derry in early 1972 
in a repeat of scenes from 1969.
The killing at Ballymurphy was recently, at the time of writing, the focus of an apol-
ogy from the British PM, Boris Johnson in 2021. It did not seem to attract as much attention 
as Bloody Sunday, which followed. The close of 1971 and the opening of 1972 saw determined 
marches against internment by NICRA and the newly formed Northern Resistance Movement 
(NRM). On 22 January, members of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment halted such a 
march with batons and rubber bullets. All of these marches were in defiance of a ban for the 
entirety of January 1972. A new demonstration took place on the 30 January in Derry. NICRA 
urged its supporters not to give the forces any excuse to use force and the local RUC com-
mander also wanted to avoid a confrontation (Finn, 2019). The RUC commander, Brendan 
Lagan received assurances that both IRA factions would not bring weapons or use it as an 
opportunity to attack the troops according to the intermediary between three parties, 
Brendan Duddy (Finn, 2019). The Commander of Land Forces, Robert Ford, in favor of mass 
arrests, ignored this. Thirteen civilians died, with a fourteenth dying later of their wounds. 
Journalists contradicted soldiers’ accounts on the day. Two months later, the Widgery 
Report that was commissioned by Heath claimed that the march had petrol bombs and sol-
diers only opened fire after being fired upon first, yet still stated that the firing “bordering 
on the reckless”. Months later, the first Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, stated the 
march was legal (O’Doherty, 2021). In 2010, the Saville Report overturned most of the con-
clusions of the Widgery Report. However, the Saville Report placed responsibility on the 
soldiers and their direct commanding officer, Derek Wilford, not Robert Ford or deputy 
Mike Jackson (Finn, 2019). This would have placed the actions of soldiers that day as more 
in line with an overall strategy of stopping the protest movement and would make the Army 
completely responsible. Finn (2019) surmises that the idea was to draw the IRA into a gun 
battle but instead helped to revive their numbers to a significant degree. McCann (2021) 
states that the lack of enthusiasm for prosecution for Soldier F has more to do with the fear 
of what he may say than actually trying to spare soldiers jail time.
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Recently, the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland decided not to pro-
ceed with charges against a “Soldier F” for the murder of two civilians during Bloody 
Sunday. McCann (2021) states that the lack of enthusiasm for prosecution for Soldier F 
has more to do with the fear of what he may say than actually trying to spare soldiers jail 
time. There was also a decision not to prosecute “Soldier B” with the murder of a 15-year-
old boy in Derry later in 1972. These decisions apparently occurred after the collapse of 
two other court cases involving military veterans (Leebody, 2021). The Royal Military 
Police initially investigated the Bloody Sunday killings and not the RUC. A previous 
murder trial over the shooting of official IRA leader Joe McCann in April 2021 ruled that 
statements received by the Royal Military Police were inadmissible. This collapsed the 
trial of Soldier F (BBC News, 2021; O’Brien, 2021). The dispute was that Mr McCann was 
evading arrest at the time two paratroopers shot him. The Royal Military Police did not 
place the suspects under caution while receiving their statements and there were other 
deficiencies in their evidence collection. Despite prosecutors saying that subsequent 
statements by the same two defendants to the Historical Enquiries Team in 2010 agreed 
with previous statements, the judge disagreed and ruled this as inadmissible evidence 
due to the PSNI not deciding to conduct a new interview under caution (BBC News, 
2021). This Historical Enquiries Team was set up to investigate unresolved deaths but 
was dissolved in controversial circumstances before it finished its investigations 
(McGovern, 2019). The Legacy Investigation Branch of the PSNI took over this work. 
There are concerns around its independence, especially considering how prominent 
RUC officers are in campaigns against these investigations (McGovern, 2019). A range of 
other bodies have been set up to investigate similar matters established under the 
Stormont House Agreement, including a Historical Investigative Unit and an Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval.
There is an important political context here as in London the Conservatives have 
sought to make historical prosecutions of soldiers in Iraq (and Northern Ireland) harder, 
with the initial abstention of the Labour Party. In Northern Ireland, since 1998, there 
have been only a handful of successful prosecutions involving loyalist and republican 
paramilitaries, but no soldiers or former RUC officers have been successfully prosecuted 
(Morris, 2021). The Government seems intent on avoiding prosecutions of serving sol-
diers and in proposals shared with the Times Newspaper in May 2021 this included seek-
ing an amnesty for all prosecutions for suspected offences, including those of republican 
and loyalist militants as well (Ward, 2021). The DUP leader Jeffrey Donaldson has mean-
while stated that there is a need to move “beyond an examination of the past” while there 
is still an acknowledgment of past suffering (Ward, 2021). Meanwhile both British and 
Irish Governments were intending to hold talks on the way forward for legacy investiga-
tions (Ward, 2021) after an apparent refusal by the British Government to continue with 
them. The British Army was directly responsible for 300 deaths and only four soldiers 
received convictions for a handful of those murders. They served less than three years 
before returning to active service (McGovern, 2019).
A lot of the interrogation techniques identified in the ICC Iraq report originated in 
Northern Ireland, showing historical links in alleged abuses during interrogation meas-
ures. There is historical linkage to the uses of counterinsurgency techniques in Kenya dur-
ing the Mau Mau Rebellion that resulted in severe abuses of civilians. It is important to 
highlight the career of Frank Kitson, who served in Northern Ireland in the run up to 
Bloody Sunday and before that served in Kenya. It is important to see the linkages in coun-
terinsurgency from earlier eras and how practices recur in different military campaigns. 
This is especially important when there are claims that previous “mistakes” result in the 
military and/or the police learning lessons.
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Crimes against the Irish: collusion
MOD figures recorded that 1,441 service personnel lost their lives during the course of the 
Troubles. This was the highest loss of life for the armed forces since the Second World War 
(McKearney, 2016). From the mid-1970s afterwards came the policy of “Ulsterization” where 
British Army involvement was scaled down in favor of supporting the locally recruited RUC 
and the UDR part-time regiment. This meant that IRA attacks on security forces took on a 
more sectarian character and helped to foster more bitter relations between the communities 
(McKearney, 2016).
The RUC/PSNI hold a reputation as a model of policing for export to countries like 
Afghanistan and Iraq, due to the experience of dealing with terrorism. This is often very 
lucrative, with this consultancy advertised to foreign governments and politicians (Ellison 
and Brogden, 2012). Along with Allen’s sardonic comment of conflict resolution being 
Northern Ireland’s largest export, the same could be said for “policing reform” (Allen, 2021). 
However, these descriptions leave out accounts of the RUC’s complicity in collusion through-
out the Troubles and facilitation of the use of loyalist paramilitary groups and assistance in 
supplying weapons, either sharing members or helping paramilitaries evade arrest.
This links to other accusations that the collusion found to have occurred between 
the military, police, and the loyalist paramilitary movements targeted not just IRA opera-
tives but political activists in Sinn Fein as well as families of both, to quash armed acts and 
support in the nationalist communities. The previous section detailed Frank Kitson’s 
deployment of the counter-gangs tactic in Kenya and this is very similar to the use of state-
sanctioned death squads. Blair appointed the retired Canadian judge Peer Cory to look into 
killings where there was any possibility of State collusion and the latter’s recommendations 
for a wide-ranging investigation were predictably ignored (Finn, 2019). McGovern (2019: 3) 
states that “collusion” as well as “counter-gangs” were prominent in Northern Ireland and 
uses victims’ groups’ descriptions of how loyalist paramilitaries had their targets identified 
and coordinated through intelligence leaks and received assurances they would not experi-
ence prosecution. He also draws on Cory’s definition of collusion through using a variety of 
synonyms such as “conspire; collaborate, to plot, to scheme” (McGovern, 2019: 3). He states 
that Cory specifically emphasizes how much omission plays a part in collusion as much as 
active commission and that there was a marked failure to act and prevent or prosecute 
actions of collusion.
This was particularly high from the mid-1980s onwards where actions by loyalist 
paramilitaries would eventually cause more annual fatalities than the PIRA. In mid-Ulster 
the IRA were highly active and targeted RUC members and members of the locally recruited 
Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) of the British Army as well as civilians, especially those who 
worked at security sites (McGovern, 2019). The fact that most of these victims were of a 
Protestant/Unionist background helped lend the conflict a sectarian edge, as would the loy-
alist paramilitary attacks and homicides against Catholic communities. The SAS were the 
main counterinsurgency unit there and their “shoot-to-kill” policy was prominent, as were 
loyalist paramilitary groups, and many of their murders held deep suspicion of collusion. 
These paramilitary groups often drew support from the same communities as the RUC and 
UDR and shared members at the same time (McGovern, 2019). The UDR formed out of the 
ashes of the B Specials – a paramilitary policing unit that worked in collaboration with the 
RUC and circumvented the ban on the Belfast Government from raising an army of its own 
(McGovern, 2019). The most infamous case of collusion was the “Glennane Gang” which 
included members of UDR and State personnel and were linked to the Miami Showband 
massacre and the bombings in Republic of Ireland in Monaghan and Dublin that left 33 dead 
(McGovern, 2019). The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) were often able to gain weapons 
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from UDR stores in well-coordinated raids. There was mass shared membership of both 
organizations (McGovern, 2019). RUC members were also deeply involved with supplying 
weapons to loyalist militants.
Prominent members of civil rights/anti-internment/anti-H-Block marches were tar-
gets of assassination attempts. This included Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin) and her 
husband, shot by gunmen several times in front of their children at their home. Members of 
the UDA carried out the attack despite paratroopers keeping the house under surveillance. 
McAliskey was prominent in the Irish Republican Socialist Party, the political voice of the 
Irish National Liberation Army which was involved, among other attacks, in the assassina-
tion of shadow Northern Ireland Secretary Airey Neave of the Conservatives. However, 
activists did not need to have links with Republican paramilitary movements. One target 
was former British Army officer turned anti-H-Block activist and republican John Turnley. 
Many of the attacks were well planned and occurred at activists’ homes.
The “shoot to kill” policy of undercover SAS units included the killing of 13 IRA volun-
teers in Loughgall, County Armagh. This formed a part of several set-piece killings that pri-
oritized deadly force over attempts to arrest. While the targeting of militants may not elicit 
much sympathy, it is important to note that the SAS shot no loyalist militants from 1976 to 
1987 and of 58 shoot-to-kill victims from 1982 to 1992 only one was loyalist. This again sug-
gests a tolerance for loyalist-led violence even during the upsurge of in loyalist killings 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s (McGovern, 2019). Deaths included civilians with no 
links to paramilitary groups. In East Tyrone in the small village of Cappagh in 1992, after a 
landmine killed a paratrooper, his comrades stationed there began engaging in low-level 
hostile confrontations with civilians, resulting in the Coalisland riots with three local civilians 
shot (McGovern, 2019). Attacks also expanded to the SDLP who were the moderate national-
ist party. Family members of IRA militants and Sinn Fein politicians were also a target at this 
time. Sectarian attacks on nationalist communities were often revenge for IRA attacks on 
Orange Halls as well as instilling fear amongst the Catholic community. It was intended to 
send a message that the IRA could not protect them and diminish support for Sinn Fein.
There were claims of course that the loyalist groups were able to target attacks due 
to intelligence support from the Army. Brian Nelson who worked with the Force Research 
Unit became the UDA’s director of intelligence and played a part in the murder of lawyer Pat 
Finucane who defended numerous IRA suspects (Finn, 2019). This all happened with the full 
knowledge of his handlers as Nelson provided intelligence for better targeting and arranged 
a key shipment of arms in 1987 from South Africa, which were used in subsequent loyalist 
killings. The 2012 De Silva Report into the murder revealed that 85% of all loyalist intelli-
gence from the mid-1980s originated from state sources (McGovern, 2019). Similarly, the 
Patten Commission urged reform of the RUC, which also faced claims of systemic collusion 
with loyalists in conjunction with the Army and MI5. The De Silva Report into the killing of 
Pat Finucane stated there was next to no legal framework for managing informers or agents. 
McGovern (2019) states this was potentially by design to allow a space for plausible deniabil-
ity and facilitate counterinsurgency. The RUC and British Army obstructed the investiga-
tions of the 1990s Stevens Inquiry after the shooting of Loughlin MacGinn. The RUC and the 
British Army blocked the release of files and afterwards a fire destroyed the Stevens office as 
well as the files (McGovern, 2019). The De Silva report stated that the fire was most likely 
intentional. After the killing of mid-Ulster UVF leader Billy Wright in 1997 attempts to 
investigate his involvement in collusion failed (McGovern, 2019).
This is reminiscent of Mbembe’s concept of “necropolitics.” Necropolitics states that 
sovereignty is not merely the domain of control over life as in the Foucauldian concept of 
“biopower” but “exercising the right to kill” (Mbembe, 2003: 12). Here the definition of the 
subject is in its existence in either life or death. In the decades that followed the massacres 
on Bloody Sunday and collusion, sovereignty as the right to kill can continue in Basra and 
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future military deployments. Mbembe links this to Bataillian concept of death as excess. 
Sovereignty is the refusal to accept limits (Mbembe, 2003). The amnesties and refusals to 
engage in wide-ranging investigations means a downgrading of the legal prohibitions on 
homicide, terrorism, sexual and physical violence. Here it manifests as a display of populist 
concern for veterans. This often stems from a politico-legal system that would never brook 
the question of prison abolition or restorative justice in criminal justice. This is not a move 
to truth and reconciliation but a bellicose defense of veterans and concealing the full extent 
of the truth behind deaths in Northern Ireland or Iraq and giving some sense of closure to 
victims or their families. Often there is a bland appeal to “move on,” to forget in the name of 
a peace of silence and denial (Jenkins, 2021) as opposed to confrontation and absolution.
Crimes against Iraqis
British forces (Multi-National Division, South-East) were responsible for the security of four 
provinces in southeastern Iraq after the 2003 invasion. These were Basra, Missan, Muthanna, 
and Thi-Qar. While this responsibility was handed back to the Iraqi authorities in stages from 
September 2004, responsibility for security in the most violent of its domains, Basra, was the 
British Army’s until December 2007, and UK combat forces remained in the region in an advi-
sory capacity until July 2009. During the period of British security provision from May 2003 
to December 2007, 3,334 violent civilian deaths were documented, and are detailed in the Iraq 
Body Count (IBC) database. Known to the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) were at least 
1,920 homicides recorded by Basra police between January 2006 and March 2008 and for-
warded to the MoD, and subsequently integrated into the IBC database after a Freedom of 
Information Act request to the MoD. These figures do not include the 1,694 civilians killed 
and the 6,184 civilians wounded in these four provinces during the US/UK-led invasion phase 
in March and April 2003 (compared to 5,720 killed and 11,154 wounded civilians documented 
for the rest of Iraq during the invasion: the southern regions were a major route of the invad-
ing ground forces). Of the post-invasion deaths from May 2003 to December 2007, 193 could 
be directly attributed to the Coalition military, of which 124 have been definitely identified as 
victims of British military action (Iraq Body Count, 2011).
The departure on 22 May 2011 of a Royal Navy mission training Iraqi sailors marked 
the official end of British Armed Forces operations in Iraq. That is, until the summer of 2014, 
when coalition forces resumed the bombing of Iraq, to “free” Iraqis from the Islamic State.
In 2014 the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), together 
with Public Interest Lawyers, submitted an article 15 communication to the ICC prosecutor, 
alleging the responsibility of UK armed forces for war crimes involving systematic detainee 
abuse in Iraq from 2003 to 2008. A preliminary investigation was opened in May 2014 that 
led first to a 2017 report which announced that the prosecutor had reached the conclusion 
that there was a reasonable basis to believe that members of UK armed forces had commit-
ted war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC against persons in their custody. The ICC 
“Situation in Iraq/UK Final Report” published on 9 December 2020 makes it clear:
There is a reasonable basis to believe that various forms of abuse were committed by 
members of UK armed forces against Iraqi civilians in detention. In particular, as set out 
below, there is a reasonable basis to believe that from April 2003 through September 
2003 members of UK armed forces in Iraq committed the war crime of wilful killing/
murder pursuant to article 8(2)(a)(i) or article 8(2)(c)(i)), at a minimum, against seven 
persons in their custody. The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe 
that from 20 March 2003 through 28 July 2009 members of UK armed forces committed 
the war crime of torture and inhuman/cruel treatment (article 8(2)(a)(ii) or article 8(2)
(c)(i)); and the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity (article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or 
article 8(2)(c)(ii)) against at least 54 persons in their custody. The information available 
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further provides a reasonable basis to believe that members of UK armed forces 
committed the war crime of rape and/or other forms of sexual violence article 8(2)(b)
(xxii) or article 8(2)(e)(vi), at a minimum, against the seven victims, while they were
detained at Camp Breadbasket in May 2003. (ICC, 2020: 4)
More specifically, “the article 15 communications allege: acts of torture and other forms of 
ill-treatment against at least 1071 Iraqi detainees; 319 unlawful killings (267 in military opera-
tions and 52 against persons in UK custody); and rape and/or other forms of sexual violence 
against 21 male detainees in 24 instances” (ICC, 2020: 11). Crimes committed by the British 
include forced exertion, wilfully causing great suffering, forced nakedness, and cultural and 
religious humiliation. “Such mistreatment was systematic and had a systemic cause, which 
further suggests that there are hundreds more such victims. There are considerable reasons to 
allege that those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes are situated at the highest 
levels, including all the way up the chain of command of the UK Army, and implicating former 
Secretaries of State for Defence and Ministers for the Armed Forces Personnel” (ICC, 2020: 12).
Crimes against Iraqi civilians by the US-UK coalition started on the night of the inva-
sion, 19–20 March 2003. Iraq Body Count’s “Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq” 2003–2005 
gave the following figures:
••  24,865 civilians were reported killed in the first two years.
••  Women and children accounted for almost 20% of all civilian deaths.
••  US-led forces killed 37% of civilian victims (IBC, 2005).
That’s 9,180 Iraqi civilians killed by the Coalition from 2003 to 2005. The Coalition went 
on to kill at least 20,000 Iraqi civilians in the next few years, many of them children. A 
search of the Iraq Body Count database shows that nearly 2,000 Iraqi children lost their 
lives in Coalition bombings and raids. The results of the search take up 72 pages. Table 1 
shows the first page.
And this is the last:
In addition, democratically elected governments in Iraq, supported by the US-UK 
coalition, have so far killed more than 4,000 Iraqi civilians through bombing and shelling 
aimed to destroy the insurgency. In the last two to three years the Iraqi police force and 
militias it supports have killed hundreds of protesters across Iraq. The Iraqi governments 
has also allowed the killing of thousands more in airstrikes by Coalition and Turkish forces 
(Hamourtziadou, 2021).
All those crimes have gone unpunished. The perpetrators have escaped accountabil-
ity. The enforced “democracy,” in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, has been celebrated as a 
triumph of the Western “liberators.” In both countries we see the exercise of power, control, 
exploitation, and violence by a complex “benevolent” hegemon: one that combines might 
with right. The uncivilized have been saved by the civilized. The invader, killer, and occupier 
is the liberating force, the saviour and provider of democracy. In the UK this humanitarian 
mask has fit into the popular narrative of British values; the aim is to do good, to do right, to 
“play fair,” and never to hurt – or to only hurt the bad ones.
From the day the planes crashed into New York’s Twin Towers, the War on Terror has 
been defined as a battle between good and evil forces, with the US-UK coalition being the good.
In “World War IV: How it Started, What it Means and Why we Have to Win,” Norman 
Podhoretz defined the War on Terror as World War IV (World War III having been the Cold 
War), “a global battle to preserve liberty” (Podhoretz, 2004). The Bush doctrine, he wrote, 
had four pillars:
••  terrorists and the regimes that sponsor them are members of an “irregular” army that
must be dealt with through war and regime change;
••  it is America’s right to pre-empt those who would attack it;
••  commitment to help friendly nations and oppose the unfriendly;
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If Bush’s World War IV doctrine was of regime change and preemption, it was so for 
the purpose of spreading freedom and other good values, and for the purpose of fighting 
evil. The language chosen to explain the 9/11 attacks worked to enforce a particular under-
standing of their political, military, and cultural meaning. It justified and normalized a mili-
tary response. Writing the War on Terror entails writing identity: the evil terrorists versus 
the good Americans and British. When he addressed the nation, Bush described the attackers/ 
hijackers as “evil,” “despicable,” “the very worst of human nature” (Bush, 2001a). They were 
“enemies of freedom,” “the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century” (Bush, 
2001b), “parasites that hide” (Bush, 2001c), and “faceless enemies of human dignity” (Bush, 
2003). As for Americans, just like the British, they were “moms and dads, friends and neigh-
bours,” “strong,” “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world,” “daring,” 
and “caring” (Bush, 2001a), “a loving and giving people” (Bush, 2001b).
It was not a distinction that could easily be dismissed or discredited, when we wit-
nessed, live, the murder of thousands of people going about their day, working, or travelling; 
when we watched men and women jumping off burning towers and crashing on the road 
below; when we heard the terror in the voices of those calling from the planes and the build-
ings, some asking for help, others sending their last messages of love. How could those men 
who inflicted such pain, such devastation and death, not be evil? And how could we, in 
fighting against them, not be good? Language is the force that creates and maintains the 
world. It is through language, the terms we use to give meaning to events and behaviors, 
that meaning is created. It is through language that “evil” and “good” are defined, “self” and 
“other” are constructed, meaning is bestowed, and knowledge is established. Moreover, this 
knowledge, this set of “truths” we accept, is produced by power, it relies on power, and it 
reinforces power. Truth and knowledge are simply and inextricably part of social settings. 
What is “true” is so within specific discourses, some of which dominate others, so that some 
truths dominate others. When the planes hit the Twin Towers, what we witnessed was metal 
hitting concrete. What this meant, in terms of it being a good act or a bad act, was not inher-
ent in the event itself, but was given, thus creating a truth and knowledge. One narrative, 
that became the dominant Western narrative, used terms such as “act of war,” “evil,” and 
“mass murder.” This then became the truth that dominated other truths in narratives that 
described the same events as part of a holy war “against the friends of Satan” (Bin Laden, 
2002). Which side was good and which side was bad, as clear as we took it to be, was not at 
all contained within the act, but was decided by a number of parties, all holders of power, 
users of speech, and moral agents. When American and British air strikes hit civilian homes 
in Iraq, killing thousands of people, much like those in the Twin Towers or on the planes, we 
again had metal hitting concrete and we again had to ask if those were good acts or evil acts. 
Those events could once again be described as “murder,” as “collateral damage,” or as “nec-
essary sacrifice” (Hamourtziadou, 2020: 29).
The Good versus Evil argument was strengthened by the war also being defined as 
Imperialism by a Benevolent Hegemon (Hamourtziadou 2020: 30). Consistent with the realist 
position, the War on Terror has been described as a neo-imperial program, designed to further 
American and British political interests. It is a struggle for power. By invading the Middle East, the 
coalition gained physical and strategic control over energy supplies, as it transformed regimes, 
brought peace, liberty, and democracy. The 9/11 attacks were an opportunity for Western values 
to be declared universal and to start to enforce them. Thus, the coalition was going to dominate 
by making its ideas and values the dominant ideas and values. This was not a new ingredient of 
imperialism, but an ages-old and enduring ideological principle that conditions the political 
attempt by a group of people to become dominant either nationally or internationally. Again, we 
see how truth and knowledge, meaning and morality, are produced through narratives that 
become dominant, that is, through power and with as much loss of life as is necessary. After all, 
the aim is to do good. Any damage done along the way was going to be justified.
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In a world order, a situation of hegemony may prevail “based on a coherent conjunc-
tion or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world 
order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a 
certain semblance of universality” (Cox, 1981: 139). This suggests that hegemony is more 
than state dominance. Hegemony appears as an expression of broadly based consent, involv-
ing the acceptance of ideas, supported by material resources and institutions. This may start 
within the state, and then be projected out to the world, as with democracy and neoliberal-
ism. Hegemony may be a form of dominance, but it is a consensual one, involving the export-
ing of ideas regarded as universally good. There may be at least an appearance of acquiescence, 
treated as natural, a product perhaps of the end of history, no matter how imposed or 
enforced the norms are (Hamourtziadou, 2020). Michael Doyle writes that a hegemon is the 
“controlling leadership of the international system as a whole” (Doyle, 1986: 40). Michael 
Mastanduno argues that hegemony is when a political unit has the power to shape the rules 
of international politics according to its own interests (Mastanduno, 2005). Stuart Kaufam, 
Richard Little, and William Wohlforth equate it with hierarchy, the political-military domi-
nation of a unit “over most of the international system” (Kaufman et al., 2007: 7). John 
Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan place the emphasis on material power, most effectively 
exercised when a hegemon is able to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). In a way, a hegemon shapes reality, if hegemony is more 
than brute force of dominance. Its values, its intersubjective meanings – shared notions 
about social relations – create a reality, a moral and ideological context, supported by insti-
tutions, that shapes desirable and acceptable thoughts and actions. Hegemony filters 
through economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, and ideology; “hegemony is one possible 
form dominance may take” (Cox, 1981: 153).
Most often in Iraq dominance was achieved through aggression. Coalition forces 
killed thousands of Iraqi civilians during the battle for Mosul that started in 2016. Table 2 
lists some of them.
The neoliberal democratic system that was imposed on the country could not have 
produced a “Western-style democracy”, or the outcomes expected in a developed nation. 
Between 2003 and 2021 the only constants have been violence, terrorism, poverty, weapons 
proliferation, crime, political instability, social breakdown, riots, disorder, and economic 
failure. Far from reaching “the end of history”, the pursuit of neoliberal transformation by 
successive Iraq governments has produced a dystopian economy and a failed state. Protesters 
carrying the Iraqi flag are demanding a country free of rule by small corrupt elites that 
Table 2 Iraqi civilians killed during the battle for Mosul
On 1 January, Nibras Ahmed Al-Muhamy was killed in an air strike in Hay Al-Sina’a, in Heet. A “precision” air 
strike that was not meant to kill civilians. (Hamourtziadou, 2016, IBC incident page d11630b.)
On 29 April, Dr Ziad Khalaf/Ziad Fakhry, a university professor, was killed in an air strike in Mosul. 
(Hamourtziadou, 2016, IBC incident page a4558.)
On 16 September, members of two families were killed in an air strike near Haji Osman mosque, in the Al-
Marhala al-Ola area in Rawa. Two of them were young boys. Brothers Walid Khaled Hammad Ngelan and 
Hamed Khaled Hammad Ngelan were killed with their father, Khaled Hammad Ngelan. Also killed was Muntasir 
Mohammed Rashid al-Rawi. (Hamourtziadou, 2016, IBC incident page d12597.)
On 11 December, an air strike took the lives of three generations of a single family, killing a grandfather and 
grandmother, their sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren. These were Haj Mumtaz Abdullah Majeed and 
his wife; Ammar Mumtaz Abdullah and his wife Lina Al-Anaz, and their children Ahmed and Abdul Rahman; 
Mustafa Mumtaz Abdullah; the wife of Mohammed Mumtaz, and his daughter Ghina (Hamourtziadou, 2016).
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maintain their power through patronage and sectarian identity; they are demanding a gov-
ernment that will provide security to all citizens; they demand an end to foreign interfer-
ence (Hamourtziadou, 2021). Eighteen years after “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Iraq is officially 
at peace, a democracy, and has officially been liberated. Yet the lines between war and peace, 
tyranny and democracy, captivity and liberation, remain blurred. As do the lines between 
good and evil.
Thousands have been arrested, imprisoned, and tortured by the new “democratic” 
regime. Protesters have been shot at and killed, any insurgency is met with shelling that kills 
insurgents as well as civilians, while political opponents have been persecuted. The Iraqis, 
the “liberated” nation George W. Bush and Tony Blair envisaged moving towards democracy 
and living in freedom, are captives of their own leaders, of their fragmented society, and of 
the legacy left by American and British forces. The crimes against humanity committed by 
the “benevolent” hegemon and their puppet regime have gone unpunished. The powerful, it 
seems, do not face justice. The First World triumphs again.
As for the ICC, it has closed the file.
Conclusion
The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (formally adopted 
on 8 August 1945) was signed by the US, the UK, the USSR, and France. The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (annexed to the Agreement) had been adopted after the 
crimes had been committed and for this reason was attacked as constituting ex post facto 
criminalization. “The Tribunal referred to the Hague Conventions, for the war crimes, and to 
the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, for crimes against peace. The judges also answered that the 
prohibition of retroactive crimes was a principle of justice and that it would fly in the face of 
justice to leave the Nazi crimes unpunished” (Schabas, 2017: 6). Japanese war criminals were 
tried under similar provisions to those used at Nuremberg, at the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Schabas, 2017).
So the crimes against the Irish could still be tried by a special Tribunal, even those 
committed before 1945. As for the Rome Statute, Article 11(1) declares that “the Court has 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute,” 
that is, beginning 1 July 2002 (Schabas, 2017: 54). The crimes against the Iraqis by the US-UK 
coalition began in March 2003. They all fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. Yet again, there 
are no prosecutions.
When the United Nations was created during the Second World War, it was with the 
aims to bring peace and prosperity to the world, to stop state aggression, and to establish and 
protect universal human rights. The various Tribunals and the establishment of International 
Law were grounded on an assumption and an ideal of universal justice. But is justice universal? 
Are human rights universal? History has shown that, while some lives matter, others do not. 
History has shown that, while some states are punished for being aggressive, others are not. 
Finally, history has shown that while some exercise of power and control is condemned as evil, 
another similar exercise of power and dominance is defended and praised as benevolent and 
strategic leadership. No matter how many die, or how many suffer in the process.
Notes
1Lily Hamourtziadou is a Senior Lecturer in Security Studies at Birmingham City University and Principal 
Research of Iraq Body Count. Lily.hamourtziadou@bcu.ac.uk
2Aidan O’Sullivan is a Lecturer in Criminology at Birmingham City University. Aidan.osullivan@bcu.ac.uk
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